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ABSTRACT 
The literature on the so-called new modes of governance in the European Union focuses on steering 
instruments beyond hierarchy and coercion. While it has repeatedly been put into question how 
‘new’ these instruments are, no systematic attention has been paid to the mutual dependency 
between policy types marked by the specific conflict lines and choice of governance tools. On the 
contrary, some attempts to classify modes of governance explicitly disregard policy typologies. 
The paper argues conversely that in order to arrive at a comprehensive mapping of modes of 
governance – ‘old’ and ‘new’ – the most promising doorway is indeed to start from the actor 
constellations characteristic for the different policy types. A review of the European Union’s 
policies and modes of governance illustrates how modes of governance are pre-defined by the 
structures between policy-makers and –takers innate to the policy types that dominate suprana-
tional policy-making.  
INTRODUCTION:  
WHY POLICY TYPES AND GOVERNANCE SHOULD SPEAK TO EACH OTHER 
In recent years the notion of new modes of governance has received considerable attention, par-
ticularly in the study of European integration. The present paper is a contribution to this body of 
literature from which it departs in a significant point, namely in taking policies as the starting 
point of governance and not the result that governance produces. The common concern of the 
‘new’ governance scholars “is about how to maintain the ‘steering’ role of political institutions 
despite the internal and external challenges to the state” (Pierre 2000: 4). Accordingly, modes of 
interaction between governing and governed are systematically analysed beyond traditional hier-
archical  steering  by  the  government.  When  “the  ‘modern  governance’  or  ‘new  governance’ 
perspective is adopted (Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1997) then the question becomes one of how 
that centre of government interacts with society to reach mutually acceptable decision or whether 
society actually does more self-steering rather than depend upon guidance from government” 
(Peters 2000: 36). Although some authors occasionally hint to the fact that the political problem 
dealt with needs to be considered to evaluate the effects of certain modes of governance, no 
study systematically includes policy types as explanatory factor to understand the logic of differ-
ent modes of governance. Much rather, policy types are analytically ignored, for instance propos-
ing a classification of modes of governance Treib et al. sustain that “tracking down different styles 
of decision-making in terms of actor constellations or institutional structures is best done without 
simultaneously including the types of policies that are the result of the decision-making” (Treib, 
Bähr et al. 2005: 13). I will argue in the opposite direction: in order to conceptualise modes of 
governance, we ought to incorporate the perspective on policy types and start from here to estab-
lish a comprehensive and consistent classification. 
 
Why should one bother about policy types when analysing governance? Studies on governance 
and policy types share a fundamental research interest but differ substantially in the focus of re-
search. Both are concerned with the way state and citizens and thus the public and the private 
realms interact in society. Yet, policy types derive from different political problems how the state’s 
coercive authority differs according to a policy-specific arena of power while governance depicts a 
more comprehensive range of steering and self-steering to embrace all possibly observable modes 
of intentional societal organisation. The former approach is limited in the range of political relation-
ships it categorises but suggests a causal link between the problem at stake and the structure of 
political decision-making and implementation whereas the latter is an analytical perspective open EUSA | LA | 2009  E.G. Heidbreder  3 
 
to describe all kinds of modes of governance that can make certain generalisbale statements on struc-
tures and mechanisms of coordination without a more genuine theoretical underpinning (Benz, 
Lütz et al. 2007: 16). Therefore, in causal models the governance perspective is mostly used 
within neo-institutionalist frameworks that put into the foreground that ‘institutions matter’ and 
shed light on institutionalised structure as explanatory. In contrast, the classical policy typology 
referred to is concerned with political conflict lines and therefore the very contents of public 
administration that influence the institutionalisation of political structures, in short: ‘policies mat-
ter’. This perception has been widely neglected in the dominant neo-institutional foci. It therefore 
promises to re-accentuate the analysis on governance to account for the basic assumption that 
“the nature of political organization depends on the conflicts exploited in the political system, 
which ultimately is what politics is about” (Schattschneider 1975: v). Moving around the same 
core question opens the door for the policy and governance literature to speak to each other. 
Centring attention on either causal links or a full depiction of empirical phenomena circum-
scribes what one has to say to the other. A theoretically sound link will therefore provide us with 
a grid to structure modes of governance according to the particular political content and conflict 
captured by the distinction between policy types. 
 
The following section provides a basic introduction to the arenas of power and respective policy 
types as developed by Theodore Lowi in the 1960s and 1970s and an overview on the central 
aspects of the governance perspective to then demonstrate how the two connect. Section three 
illustrates the framework by discussing how the different arenas of power work present them-
selves from a governance perspective in EU policy-making. The article concludes by summarising 
the analytical contribution, practical implications and normative questions that arise from taking a 
governance perspective on the arenas of power.  
 
2  THE ARENAS OF POWER AND MODES OF GOVERNANCE 
The theoretical section will briefly introduce the two theoretical approaches to highlight the rele-
vant conceptualisations of steering and political interaction between governing and governed 
units. While the arenas of power approach holds that different policy types imply different political 
relationships,  the  governance  approach  is  more  broadly  concerned  with  modes  of  interaction.  As 
Renate Mayntz points out, the turn from theories on political steering (Steuerungstheorien) to gov-
ernance moved the attention from actors to the structures of governance (Mayntz 2008: 16). 
Both the arenas of power and governance focus on structures of state/society relationships. They 
differ in the scope of governance modes they consider and the causal explanations on the emer-
gence of governance modes they offer. The arenas of power establish a causal link between pol-EUSA | LA | 2009  E.G. Heidbreder  4 
 
icy types (that allude to different political problems) and coercive, hierarchical governing struc-
tures. The governance school describes structures of governance beyond hierarchical coercive 
mechanisms, without however linking these systematically back to policy types or conflict con-
stellations of political problems at stake. How these two approaches link up to provide a com-
prehensive typology of modes of ‘new’ and ‘old’ governance will be developed along the empiri-
cal application to the European Union in section 3. The next pages provide the conceptual foun-
dation for this purpose. 
 
2.1  The Arenas of Power: Political Relationships according to Policy Type  
Theodore Lowi’s classical typology of policy types foots on the assumption that policies deter-
mine politics rather than the other way around (Lowi 1964, 1972, 1988b). Lowi thus inversed the 
usually assumed causal direction in order to “turn political science on its head (or back on its 
feet)” (Lowi 1988b: xi). Accordingly, the political relationships between the state and the individ-
ual differ depending on the political problem at stake. Distinguishing between the impact a policy 
has on the individual (working through individual conduct/environment of conduct) and the 
form of expressed intention (immediate coercion or – in later versions – primary rule/remote 
coercion or secondary rule) provides the grid to define four arenas of power. Each arena brings 
forth a particular policy type (Table 1). 
 
APPLICABILITY 
OF COERCION 
LIKELIHOOD  
OF COERCION  
WORKS THROUGH 
INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT 
WORKS THROUGH 
ENVIRONMENT OF CONDUCT 
IMMEDIATE 
 
REGULATORY POLICIES 
Example: elimination of substandard 
goods, unfair competition, fraudu-
lent advertising 
 
REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES 
Example: Federal Reserve controls 
of credit, progressive income tax, 
social security  
 
REMOTE 
 
DISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES 
Example: 19th century land policies, 
tariffs, subsidies 
 
 
CONSTITUENT POLICIES 
Example: reappointment, setting up 
a new agency, propaganda 
Table 1:  Arenas of Power/Policy Typology       (Lowi 1972: 300) 
 
Regulatory policies, although rules stated in general terms, impact directly on individuals by rais-
ing costs and/or reducing or expanding alternative options. They are laws that focus on desired 
outcomes, imposing obligations and sanctions. In contrast to constituent rules that prescribe 
general procedures without prior definition of the substantive subject matters, regulatory policies 
have a concrete target. Accordingly, “[s]ince the most stable lines of perceived common impact EUSA | LA | 2009  E.G. Heidbreder  5 
 
are the basic sectors of the economy, regulatory decisions are cumulative largely along sectoral 
lines; regulatory policies are usually disaggregable only down to the sector level” (Lowi 1964: 
691). As regards the mode of interaction, regulatory policies evoke group conflict because they 
imply the betterment of some at the expense of others.  
Redistributive policies are primary rules (immediate likelihood of coercion) that exert 
coercion by manipulating the environment of conduct rather than conduct of individuals directly. 
Redistributive policies categorise activities in that they impose classifications or statutes under 
which individuals are subsumed involuntarily (Lowi 1985: 73). They affect social classes (property 
itself, equal possession, and the ‘being’) and the effects are not disaggreable as under distributive 
policies – winners and losers are openly conveyed. State-society relationships therefore involve 
the major interest representations in order to channel strongly ideological positions. 
Distributive or patronage (Lowi 1988b) policies are based on secondary rules (remote 
coercion) working through individual conduct without imposing obligations. Without regard of 
limited resources they confer privileges or facilities in a disaggregated manner. Privileges are allot-
ted to small units or individuals that stand more or less in isolation from other units. Therefore 
distributive policies “are virtually no policies at all but are highly individualized decisions that 
only by accumulation can be called a policy” (Lowi 1964: 690). Coercion is remote because of the 
permissive and dispersed effect on citizens. Therefore, political interaction is marked by mutual 
non-interference, instead of compromises on opposed interests. Decision-making is characterised 
by logrolling and putting together in a ‘pork barrel’ unrelated interests. In contrast to redistribu-
tive policies, it is not directly visible who is paying for the disaggregated benefits and group con-
flict is not evoked. 
Constituent policies did not feature in Lowi’s original model and were subsequently 
added as fourth type completing the typology. It remains empirically and conceptually the least 
developed arena of power but was an essential addition to complete the typology. In Lowi’s 
phrasing, “a fourth category of policy closed the logic of the scheme, giving me a system of public pol-
icy and a method of characterizing and reasoning in comparisons of policies within a logical struc-
ture” (2008: 15, italics in original). Constituent rules are secondary rules conferring powers of 
privileges, and work through the environment. They are “referred to as rules about powers or 
rules about rules” (Lowi 1985: 74) or, in other words, the monopoly to decide where and how to 
locate authority to coerce in a system of governance. 
 
Important for relating policy types to modes of governance are the political relationships specific 
for each type. These take expression in the potential for conflict and how conflict is resolved in 
policy formulation. This relates directly to modes of governance that deal in essence with the EUSA | LA | 2009  E.G. Heidbreder  6 
 
same question: how are state/society relations organised in different modes of interaction? The 
main tenet of Lowi’s typology is that policies matter. The policy type links back to a specific po-
litical problem and shapes the institutional structures to resolve different kinds of conflicts. Al-
though actors can frame problems differently and expectations play a decisive role in the choice 
of a policy type, the arena chosen and the policy type formulated determines eventually how 
state/society relations are organised. Thinking further in this logic suggested by Lowi, the kind of 
formal rule applied circumscribes a specific mode of governance.   
 
2.2  Modes of Governance 
In her review on the development from steering to governance research, Mayntz points out that the 
decisive insight of empirical policy research was that the success of policy-making did not depend 
alone on the ability to steer. A hierarchical top-down approach missed the need to account for 
sector-specific structures that determine the ability of policy-takers to oppose policies. Science 
and practice moved from top-down steering to include policy takers into the formulation and 
implementation of policies. Consequently, the distinctions between the subjects and objects of 
political  steering  were  consequently  blurred  and  negotiation  became  both  a  non-hierarchical 
mode of interaction and steering instrument (Mayntz 2008: 44). Although taking note of the rele-
vance of sectoral differences for the structure of actor constellations, the governance school did 
not advance by systematically accounting for variance between policies. Instead the main atten-
tion  lies  on  the  procedural  feature  of  governance  in  contrast  to  state-centred  static  notion  of 
authoritative government. The political scientific definition of governance referred to in the follow-
ing is the sum of all forms of intentional collective coordination and regulation of societal con-
cerns (Mayntz 2008: 45). It encompasses every mode of political steering involving public and 
private actors (Héritier 2002). This definition is wide in the sense that it embraces both ‘old’ 
hierarchical and ‘new’ non-coercive forms of governance (Schuppert 2008: 24; Benz 2004b), and 
narrow in that it excludes societal self-coordination that is unrelated to public policy (e.g. indus-
trial or corporate governance of private companies). Governance is an analytical perspective and 
not a theory proper, it serves to describe and evaluate real-life processes and can thus linked to 
various theories for causal analysis (Benz 2004a: 27).  
 
As analytical perspective in political science, governance has been applied to account for increas-
ing non-hierarchical cooperation due to changed internal and external roles of the state.
1 Thus, 
                                                 
1  The definitions of governance referred to is by no means a comprehensive one and does not pro-
vide a balanced introduction of the variety the term covers across the discipline. The purpose is to high-
light those aspects that are most relevant for the argument. Accordingly, throughout the present paper the EUSA | LA | 2009  E.G. Heidbreder  7 
 
across the sub-disciplines of public administration and public policy, international relations and 
comparative policy, governance “refers to something broader than government, and it is about 
steering and the rules of the game” (Kjær 2004: 7). Inside the state, the governance perspective 
serves to account for a changed role of the state from hierarchical to cooperative steering, or 
network governance involving public and private actors (Rhodes 1997, 2007). Between states, 
due to increased internationalisation the context states act in has changed which has given a 
boost  to  the  governance  perspective  in  international  relations  as  governance  without  government 
(Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). From this perspective other actors besides the state enter (or even 
take over) the international scene. Authors that sustain that states remain relevant actors point 
out how their role changes in an international system of governance with governments (Zürn 2005). 
The broadest concern of governance in all these variants is “how to steer, but also how to im-
prove accountability” (Kjær 2004: 11) and thus how legitimacy, efficiency, democracy and ac-
countability mutually influence each other. All these dimensions change if actor constellations in 
policy formulation and implementation change and the separation of public and private, policy-
makers and -taker is blurred. The same applies to supranational governance where states as nego-
tiating parties are also the addressees of a policy and thus a clear distinction between policy-
makers and -takers becomes impossible (Mayntz 2008: 47). This holds also for important parts of 
policy-making in the European Union which, being more than a regime and less than a state. The 
EU has a well-developed institutional structure that equips it with means for limited hierarchical 
steering but leaves at the same time many areas subject to intergovernmental or transnational 
coordination. As the subsequent empirical section will illustrate, this makes the EU a particularly 
interesting polity to study a wide range of modes of governance.  
 
Benz’ juxtaposition of the two the government and governance perspectives (Table 2) pinpoints 
the core difference between the political relationships contained in the arenas of power and 
modes of governance. A look at the left column reveals that the mechanisms and instruments 
correspondent intuitively well with the arenas of power. Lowi takes an unambiguous government 
perspective.  Moreover,  the  different  lines  can  be  attributed  to  the  different  policy  arenas. 
Constituent policies are indeed concerned with questions of the polity, they focus on the state 
and rules about rules and rules about power. The mechanisms linked to politics are related to the 
redistributive arena where zero-sum games are fought out along ideological conflict lines. What 
features as policies in table 2, finally, are regulative and distributive policies. Moving to the gov-
                                                                                                                                                       
definition of governance applied builds strongly on public policy research. It stands thus in the tradition of 
governance research that moved the study of EU integration away from international relations theories 
(Kjær 2004: 99) but pushes the argument an essential bit further towards some basic concerns of public 
policy research. EUSA | LA | 2009  E.G. Heidbreder  8 
 
ernance column, the mechanisms described are basically all outside those considered in the gov-
ernment-centred political relationships of the arenas of power. They represent an addition to 
these if we assume that both ‘old’ and ‘new’ governance are of relevance, especially in polities like 
the EU that lack decisive features of government and have only limited political authority. How-
ever, it is not intuitively clear how the features of governance listed here fit to a specific policy 
type. The next section will deal with this question, namely, how to link the government and gov-
ernance perspective along the policy typology.  
 
  GOVERNMENT 
State vs. market/society 
GOVERNANCE 
State, market and networks as complementary 
modes of steering 
POLITY 
 
- Focus on the state; 
- Democracy based on majority rule and hier-
archy as the most important institution 
 
- Institutional structure that combine elements 
of hierarchy, negotiation systems and competi-
tion mechanisms; 
- Networks 
 
 
POLITICS 
 
- Competition between parties for power and 
between interest groups for influence; 
- Conflict resolution by decision of responsi-
ble state bodies and enforcement of state 
decisions. 
 
 
- Conflicts between ruling / governing and 
ruled upon / affected actors 
- Steering and coordination in the context of 
systems of institutionalised rules 
- Negotiation between public and/or private 
actors; 
- Adaptation of systems of institutionalised 
rules. 
POLICIES 
 
- Legislation (command and prescriptions) 
- Distribution of public benefits 
 
 
- Communication (in networks and in com-
munities), compromises, bartering; 
- Co-production of collective goods; 
- Network management; 
- Institutional policies (management of institu-
tional change). 
 
Table 2:  Government and Governance as Perspectives in Political Science 
(Benz 2004a: 21; own translation) 
 
2.3  Governance in the Arenas of Power 
If each policy type refers back a specific political conflict and if each arena of power establishes a 
distinct mode of conflict resolution, each policy type can also be attributed specific modes of 
governance. For Lowi, this means apparently hierarchical steering: “[p]ublic policy can be defined 
simply as an official expressed intention backed by sanction. Although synonymous with law, 
rule, statute, edict, and regulation, public policy is the term of preference today probably because 
it conveys more of an impression of flexibility and compassion than the other terms” (1988b: x). 
Building on M. Weber, he asserts that coercion is “basic to all state action” (Lowi 1985: 69). How 
can this view reconciled with non-hierarchical modes of governance?  EUSA | LA | 2009  E.G. Heidbreder  9 
 
 
A possible linkage becomes evident when taking a closer look at the fringes of each approach. 
On the one hand, Lowi’s notion of remote coercion is not as restrictive and overlaps with what 
others call non-hierarchical steering. On the other hand, it has been pointed out convincingly that 
non-hierarchical steering is effective only under certain conditions and especially only under a 
credible shadow of hierarchy.  
Lowi’s conceptualisation of coercion has been criticised by many before.
2 The author 
himself replaced the dimension likelihood of coercion with form of expressed intention that can be pri-
mary or secondary rules (Lowi 1985). Yet, also these more legal expressions of how a policy is 
formulated do not break with the top-down government perspective. If we turn to the mecha-
nisms through which the single policies work and thus the logic of the governance tools applied, 
the meaning of coercion seems less restrictive. “A great part of the ultimate success of a public 
policy may be attributable to the mere statement of the preferred future state of affairs. The pur-
pose of good citizenship is to make public policies virtually self-executing. But most policies are 
accompanied by explicit means of imposing their intentions on their environments, and in all 
policies some techniques of control are inherent” (Lowi 1985: 69-70). Further, Lowi rejects the 
idea that coercion serves to bind those who oppose a policy. On the contrary he emphasises that 
“it is government coercion that makes participation inevitable (if permitted, so that we are speak-
ing here only of liberal systems)” (Lowi 1988a: 727). To pay respect to the insight that policy-
takers were actors in there own right (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973) that can reject public poli-
cies, which lead to a shift from steering to governance (see above p. 6), we need to admit that not 
                                                 
2  In  more  generic  terms,  many  have  put  into  question  Lowi’s  conception  of  coercion  before 
(Spitzer 1987; Salisbury and Heinz 1970; Olson 1965, 1982; Wilson 1973; Kjellberg 1977; Kellow 1989). 
Spitzer expresses a similar critique as the one spelled out above (1987: 684), proposing the addition of the 
dimension of “new regulation”. While the addition of a dimension has itself been criticised for distorting 
the elegance of the typology, the limitations of basing the taxonomy on the notion of ‘coercion’ has lead 
other scholars to propose alternatives, especially linking Lowi’s approach back to Schattschneider’s con-
ceptualisation of the scope of conflict as determining political relationships (Schattschneider 1975), as well 
as the differentiation between structural policies (rules for future allocation) and allocative policies (con-
ferring direct benefits) (Salisbury and Heinz 1970) and the concept costs and benefits (Olson 1965, 1982; 
Wilson 1973). In this vein, Kjellberg dwelled on the transactional perspective of the model and thus the 
inadequately reflected threefold distinction between the provision of goods and services, indirect alloca-
tion of benefits, and the most indirect form of impacting on welfare through governmental organisation 
(Kjellberg 1977: 558). Elaborating this further Kellow phrases this very issue most bluntly: a “typology 
based upon the nature of costs and benefits is preferable because it incorporates the relationships between 
government and beneficiaries in a way in which a coercion-based schema cannot. It makes no sense to 
talk of the recipient of a subsidy being coerced in any way; the taxpayer is coerced into paying for the 
subsidy, but it is the manner in which the benefit is sought and provided which determines the absence of 
active  opposition  from  the  taxpayer  which  gives  rise  to  the  patterns  which  characterize  this  arena” 
(Kellow 1989: 541). The common line of critique focuses on the problem the concept of coercion poses, 
most evidently in the distributive arena. This raises another point than the extension towards alternative 
modes of steering discussed above: the different arenas of power themselves are by the logic of their func-
tioning more or less ‘coercive’, raising the question whether the voluntary adaptation of behaviour in ex-
change for benefits is a different category to ‘coercion’ altogether.  EUSA | LA | 2009  E.G. Heidbreder  10 
 
state coercion or the threat of sanctions alone trigger ‘good citizenship’ but that citizens them-
selves need to respond to and are therefore integral part of governance. Policies under of remote 
coercion, or secondary rules, that confer privileges or powers are backed by the only ‘coercive’ 
means  of  withdrawing  rewards.  In  governance  terminology,  these  are  instruments  such  
as incentive setting and supply by public bodies which trigger voluntary responses (Windhoff-
Héritier 1987). 
Whereas the arenas of power overemphasise the role of coercion as an ever present and 
effective  tool  to  create  cooperation,  the  governance  perspective  has  been  accused  for being 
‘power blind’ (Mayntz 2004) for assuming in some cases the intention of actors for collective 
cooperation. It does not account for the absence of an intention for steering altogether as cause 
for failed cooperation (Benz, Lütz et al. 2007: 18). More plainly still, if we want to account for the 
networks and hierarchies to coexist, “governance becomes a matter of confronting complex and 
varying institutional arrangements. In that sense, Rhodes’ title ‘The New Governance: Governing 
without Government’ is misleading. ‘Governing with more than government’ would be more the 
point” (Kjær 2004: 44; Rhodes 1996). In response, some governance research has shown that 
only under specific conditions non-hierarchical steering is successful. Most explicitly, the neces-
sity of a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ for non-hierarchical governance to be effective has been pointed 
out (Scharpf 2002; Héritier 2003; Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008; Héritier and Eckert 2008; Smis-
mans 2008). Börzel refers in this vein to a paradox of non-hierarchical governance: states draw 
on new governance in cases in which they lack sufficient means to ‘command and control’ but 
they need nonetheless a minimum of authority to potentially impose a policy, else private actors 
lack the incentive to involve into self-steering. For new modes of governance to come to effect, a 
shadow of hierarchy is indispensable – even if it does not need to be all that long (Börzel 2007). 
It is this shadow of hierarchy for ‘new’ governance that matches Lowi’s notion of incentives as a 
form of coercion where the two approaches meet. 
 
We can thus link the two views on collective cooperation to resolve political conflicts. To ac-
count for the degree of hierarchy implied in a mode of governance, the level of discretion cap-
tures the degree to which policy-takers are restricted by public policies. The more discretion, the 
less hierarchical is the mode of governance. To account for the contend or intended objective of 
a public policy which has been pointed out to be decisive for the mode of governance, the way a 
policy goal is framed is decisive. The dimensions of Lowi’s typology can accordingly be trans-
formed to the respective modes of governance that result from them. Likelihood of coercion is there-
fore implied by the framing of coercion. Instead of applicability of coercion that indicate whether an indi-
vidual is affected directly or whether the environment of conduct is adapted, the framing of policy EUSA | LA | 2009  E.G. Heidbreder  11 
 
objectives appeals to whether a governance instrument is explicit in prescribing the intended policy 
goal or implicit in that the instruments applied are intended to set off processes that to achieve a 
particular goal. Table 3 places the policy types into this grid of modes of governance. The ‘pure’ 
or ‘ordinary’ types are the restrictive or discretionary forms of framing coercion that differ ac-
cording to policy type.  
Beyond that, each policy type can be executed in a less restrictive or less discretionary 
manner. Therefore, I extend each cell by an additional box that defines the more discretionary 
regulative  or  redistributive  policies  and  more  restrictive  distributive  and  constituent  policies. 
Lowering restrictiveness, regulatory policies that are backed by sanctions, and standards for posi-
tions in society that are not imposed can be formulated. In turn, lowering the level of discretion, 
distribution can be conditional when rewards are bound to obligations as much as constituent 
policies that confer powers can further restrict these by informal norms or networks that intro-
duce additional institutional rules.  
 
FRAMING OF 
OBJECTIVES 
FRAMING 
OF COERCION  
EXPLICIT 
(policy goals specific) 
IMPLICIT 
(policy goals transmitted) 
RESTRICTIVE 
(imposes obliga-
tions/positions) 
 
REGULATORY POLICIES 
Rules imposing obligations, rules on indi-
vidual conduct, criminal in form 
 
 
 
REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES 
Rules imposing status; categorising 
activity 
 
 
Extending discretion/ 
reducing restrictiveness 
softening coercion 
 
 
Non-binding rules on individual conduct 
 
 
 
Corporatism, negotiation between 
public / private actors  
 
Extending restrictions/ 
limiting discretion/ 
hardening coercion 
 
 
Rules conferring facilities or privileges in 
exchange for economic or membership 
rewards, conditionality 
 
 
Network governance, institutional 
norms of behaviour 
DISCRETIONARY 
(confers privileges/powers) 
 
Rules conferring facilities or privileges 
unconditionally 
 
DISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES 
 
Rules confer powers; rules about 
rules and about authority 
 
CONSTITUENT POLICIES 
 
Table 3:  Steering Instruments by Arena of Power 
 
In sum, the attribution of modes of governance to policy types offers a differentiated grid for the 
analysis of intentional collective coordination of societal concerns. Policies matter because they 
limit the choice for restrictive or discretionary policy instruments. Within the realm of each arena 
of power itself, the degree of discretion for policy-takers can vary. It remains however restricted EUSA | LA | 2009  E.G. Heidbreder  12 
 
by the scope the political relationships of the arena offer. The next section will illustrate this 
framework by applying it to the European Union’s system of multi-level governance.   
 
3  POLICY TYPES AND GOVERNANCE MODES  
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The following empirical illustration will bring two central points to the fore: (1) the European 
Union has not fully developed all four arenas of power, ergo its structures provide tools for tradi-
tional governmental steering (‘old’ governance) only in a limited sense; (2) the EU has developed 
a wide array on non-hierarchical steering (‘new’ governance) to supplement and substitute lacking 
political authority, ergo as much few stress the EU’s ‘old’ governance characteristics (but Börzel 
2008; Jachtenfuchs 2008), a lot of academic attention has focussed on ‘new’ governance in the 
EU. The empirical review embraces all steering instruments the EU applies to depict the ele-
ments of government and governance according to arena of power. This overview makes two 
contributions. First, it illustrates the typology of modes of governance within arenas of power. 
Second, it puts the different modes of governance (‘old’ and ‘new’) into a systematised relation to 
each other. In essence, starting from policies to understand the extension and dominance of dif-
ferent modes of governance renders comprehensible why the EU relies on which policy tools 
and defines some boundaries for the effectiveness of single modes of governance in the presence 
or absence of certain other modes.  
 
I will skip through the four arenas of power to discuss which relevance and shape they have in 
EU policy-making from the ‘old’ and subsequently the ‘new’ governance perspective. Table 4 
summarises which steering instruments are actually used in EU governance. 
 
3.1  Governance in the Regulatory Arena 
It is generally accepted that the EU produces predominantly regulative policies (Majone 1996 
makes this point most rigidly). Restrictive steering is an established mode of exercising coercion 
as defined also by Lowi, namely binding legislative acts. Examples in the EU are the formally 
binding legal acts (regulations, directives and decisions) which leave at best limited leeway for 
interpretation to the member states. In cases of non-compliance, the Commission and European 
Court of Justice can sanction member states. Hard regulation in the EU concentrates predomi-
nantly on the economic sector and the core competences of the Community laid down in the 
founding Treaties. The political relationships in the regulative arena have changed over time. In-
terest representation has increased with the widening of the regulative agenda. In particular in 
order to raise the legitimacy of EU regulation, the EU Commission has promoted explicitly the EUSA | LA | 2009  E.G. Heidbreder  13 
 
consultation and participation of non-state actors since the publication of the white book on 
governance (Commission of the European Communities 2001). Although interest groups do not 
have direct influence on decision-making, one can observe that in the regulative arena decision-
making has developed well beyond intergovernmental cooperation. This is most evident in the 
strongly enhanced importance of the European Parliament in the legislative process. 
 
Complementing hard regulation, the EU has a variety of tools, both in form of non-binding 
agreements among member states and as formalised regulation that leave considerable discretion 
to member states (especially recommendations, framework decisions and the instruments of the 
second and third pillar). In other words, the regular legislative procedures of the EU provide for 
instruments that are less coercive than simple top-down coercion that leave considerable discre-
tion to the member states on how to transpose regulatory policies. Still more discretionary is EU 
soft law that has no binding effect but – in contrast to the redistributive arena subsequently dis-
cussed – can refer to a shadow of hierarchy because the regulatory arena and the respective pos-
sibility for coercive steering is well established (López-Santana 2006; Trubek and Trubek 2005; 
Sisson and Marginson 2001; Cini 2000).  
 
3.2  Governance in the Redistributive Arena 
Examples for redistributive policies in a strict sense are meagre. Most relevantly, the EU has no 
authority to raise taxes. It has to work on a balanced budget which is mostly based on member 
state contributions based on a fixed percentage of GDP each state has to contribute. The level of 
contributions is therefore not staggered but derives from relative differences in national GDPs. 
The European Council’s budgetary negotiations on member state contributions are thus also the 
closest the EU gets to political relationships that classify member states. In essence the EU does 
not have a redistributive arena proper. EU social policy is accordingly also mostly framed as 
regulative policy, there is no EU pension or health security scheme. Accordingly, the EU also 
lacks the political relationships, such as strong EU social partners, that would represent broad 
ideological lines. Keeping redistributive competences – and with it ideological group conflict – 
off the EU agenda results also in the critique that the European Parliament remains a depoliti-
cised body which does not work along a polarised left/right spectrum.  
 
Moving to non-hierarchical governance, one condition for it to be successful is a well-established 
network of actors that are sufficiently committed to produce collective outcomes also in the ab-
sence of coercion. The EU lacks corporatist structures or compulsory negotiation networks be-
tween private actors, relevant policy-making is dominated by member state governments and not EUSA | LA | 2009  E.G. Heidbreder  14 
 
private actors (Mayntz 2008). Chances for effective redistributive results should therefore be low. 
The EU has nonetheless developed ‘new’ governance especially in the redistributive arena to 
compensate for its lack of formal competences. In recent years, overwhelming attention has been 
paid to ‘new’ governance that has been established without the shadow of hierarchy to formulate 
redistributive policies backed by coercion on the EU level. Especially in connection with the Lis-
bon Agenda (Commission of the European Communities 2006a) new modes of governance have 
been introduced to substitute for restrictive redistributive policies. Working through means such 
as targeting, peer reviews and the development of non-binding standards adaptations of the na-
tional systems are to be promoted under the open method of coordination. Without the backing of 
restrictive policy instruments underpinned by identifiable political relationships in matters high 
conflict potential such as social policy, the effectiveness of these measures and their actual redis-
tributive impact have been seriously brought into question (de la Porte 2002; Schäfer 2004; Scott 
and Trubek 2002) and the legitimacy of has become a matter of debate (Benz 2007).  
 
3.3  Governance in the Distributive Arena 
Although overall a midget in quantitative terms (Sbragia 2000: 323), distributive policies have a 
central qualitative importance for EU policy-making.  Policy tools in the distributive arena guar-
antee by default more discretion to policy takers who receive unconditional benefits. Spending 
under the restricted and institutionally inflexible EU budgetary rules were created mostly as side-
payments to some member states, either to create agreement for further integration or enlarge-
ment or to account for specific needs of newly entered states (van der Beek and Neal 2004). They 
establish patronage relationships because they are dispersed mostly to sub-national units whose 
revision is explicitly not subject to broad ideological conflict – the EU financial instruments con-
fer privileges much rather than imposing societal positions. To illustrate the policy type with an 
example from the EU, its major characteristics are well reflected in about forty percent of the EU 
budget spent under the title of the Common Agricultural Policy. By nature of the political relation-
ships  they  establish,  also  the  EU’s  Cohesion  and  Regional  Policy,  likewise  established  as  side-
payments, have the traits of patronage rather than redistributive policies. This classification foots 
especially on the way the EU disperses money, which is in a disaggregated manner to regional 
recipient units that make it impossible to trace concretely winners and losers. Wallace accordingly 
affirms that in the EU a “distributional mode” of policy-making prevails (Wallace 2005: 82-85). 
Thus, the way in which Community money is dispersed creates patronage relationships with spe-
cific beneficiaries which are traded off by log-rolling, rather than resembling conflict resolution 
typical for the redistributive arena.  As the Commission states itself “[u]nlike in the case of na-
tional  budgets,  where  progressive  taxation  plays  an  important  redistributive  role,  in  the  EU EUSA | LA | 2009  E.G. Heidbreder  15 
 
budget, contributions are proportional to the capacity to pay measured by nominal GNP at cur-
rent exchange rates. Redistributive objectives, as noted above, are, therefore, pursued through 
expenditure alone” (Commission of the European Communities 2006b). Through ‘expenditure 
alone’ no truly redistributive policy can be established, it will perforce turn out distributive be-
cause the political relationships that emerge in the implementation phase will be patronage-like.   
 
To counterbalance these established patronage policies, net-paying member states have increas-
ingly pushed to lessen discretion of recipients. While patronage policies established at the EU 
level have shown very difficult to reform, let alone terminate (see British rebate or CAP), they 
have increasingly been bound to conditions. Conditional privileges increase the constraining con-
trol over recipients of funds. The patronage nature of political relationships is sustained but dis-
cretion of the policy-takers is reduced granting the implementing body considerable leverage in 
evaluating compliance with the conditions. We therefore see a clear development away from 
Lowi’s ideal typical definition of unconditional distributive policies.  
‘New’ governance in terms of network governance has an ambiguous role. Generally, “in 
some environments, no interest group is continuously active. This occurs when a policy offers 
widely distributed benefits and widely distributed costs” (Kjær 2004: 48). Initially, cohesion policy 
limited  the  Commission’s  role  to  dispersing  money  and  only  with  enlargement  to  relatively 
poorer member states the Commission was given more influence to control EU funds (van der 
Beek and Neal 2004), which implied more control over and restrictions for the recipients. With 
the introduction of a uniform regulation framework for the design and implementation of EU 
funded programmes conditionality rose and with it networks between regional actors and the 
Commission came into being so that today regions are well represented and active participants in 
Brussels (Kjær 2004: 110). 
 
3.4  Governance in the Constituent Arena 
Formal Treaty articles, finally, are the expression of constituent policies. They are discretionary 
because they create powers for certain actors. At the same time, defining rules about authority 
and rules about rules also has restrictive effects because formal institutions impose constraints. 
Still, it makes sense to distinguish constituent rules from the redistributive arena. Accordingly, the 
institutional rules which make constituent policies are defined as enabling actors, i.e. creating 
discretion to coerce. Due to the official regime character of the EU, member states remain the 
ultimate masters of the Treaties. This implies essentially that ‘in the long run all EU policies are 
constituent’ because they are at the end of the day based on agreement between states that confer 
powers. According to the principle of conferral, the EU formally only exists where competences EUSA | LA | 2009  E.G. Heidbreder  16 
 
have been shifted to the supranational level. De facto, the supranational level has, however, devel-
oped a life and authority that surmounts pure intergovernmental cooperation. In terms of control 
this is evident also in the fact the European Court of Justice (ECJ) can only judge on EU policies 
and has no powers beyond, while where it has stretched the interpretation of what it felt entitled 
to judge on, it has implicitly created powers. In the same vein, the intergovernmental second and 
third pillars that guarantee member states’ ultimate authority over issues are excluded from ECJ 
jurisdiction. In practice, the application of the principles of direct effect and primacy of EU law 
give the EU Treaties a constitutional character (European Court of Justice 1986; Weiler 1991). 
These two legal principles are therefore the two constituting pillars the Union’s coercive power 
beyond the regime character has found constitutional expression in, even if member state authory 
formally remains the bottom-line of the Treaties.
3 
 
Following this reasoning that constituent policies confer powers, informal rules that adjust the 
power relations of actors increase the level of restrictiveness for those who originally hold the mo-
nopoly on authority. Informal institutions are thus understood as limiting further those actors 
who are formally endowed with certain powers. Especially the work by Farrell and Héritier has 
focussed on the decisive role of informal institutions in the EU decision making process on the 
EU level (2003; 2005; 2007). Another important aspect are inter-institutional agreements which 
have an important role in EU policy-making processes (Slominski 2007; Hummer 2007b; Kietz 
and Maurer 2007; Eiselt, Pollak et al. 2007; Hummer 2007a; Eiselt and Slominski 2006). Network 
governance is at work and enables decision-making for example in the budgetary procedure that 
is strongly ruled by informal institutions all actors abide. Since restrictive decision-making rules in 
the EU do not only make joint decision-making difficult but render decisions also basically irre-
versible, informal institutions and networks are that limit the power of dominant actors are highly 
relevant for in the EU.  
                                                 
3  The ultimately constituent nature of EU law features in the revised founding Treaties that lack an 
explicit hierarchy of law, i.e. detailed rules on sectoral policies have the same status and are subject to the 
same revision procedures as rules of constitutional character and are thus also found in the Treaties them-
selves. In short, lacking a ‘Kompetenzkompetenz’, i.e. the competence to establish its own competences 
to create rules, the EU lacks constituent policies in the narrow sense of establishing rules about power. 
Room for manoeuvre exists only where the Treaties grant exclusive competences and where legislation 
based on this pushes the boundaries of formal competences. EUSA | LA | 2009  E.G. Heidbreder  17 
 
Table 4 sums up which instruments the EU uses in each arena and which policies can be attrib-
uted to each policy type.  
 
FRAMING OF 
OBJECTIVES 
FRAMING 
OF COERCION  
EXPLICIT 
(policy goals specific) 
IMPLICIT 
(policy goals transmitted) 
RESTRICTIVE 
(imposes obliga-
tions/positions) 
 
REGULATORY POLICIES 
Rules imposing obligations, rules on indi-
vidual conduct, criminal in form 
Example EU:  
Regulations, directives, decisions in: competition, 
economics/finance, trade, environment, food 
safety/health/consumer affairs, transport; 
in CFSP: joined actions. 
 
 
REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES 
Rules imposing status; categorising 
activity 
Example EU:  
Setting of capped member state contribu-
tions to the EU budget 
 
Extending discretion/ 
reducing restrictiveness 
softening coercion 
 
 
Soft law: Non-binding/flexible rules 
Example EU: 
Recommendations, framework decisions, conven-
tions, non-binding acquis (e.g. in nuclear safety);  
in CFSP: principles and general guidelines, 
common strategy, common positions (also JHA)  
 
 
Targeting, indicative standards   
Example EU: 
Open Method of Coordination  
 
 
Extending restrictions/ 
limiting discretion/ 
hardening coercion 
 
 
Conditional privileges, imposed patronage 
relationships  
Example EU: 
Co-financing in Common Agricultural Policy, 
Structural Policy, Cohesion Policy; conditional 
targeting for funds (e.g. administrative capacity 
building), International Aid (ENP)  
 
 
Informal institutions (complemen-
tary/accommodating), norms of 
behaviour (additive) 
Example: 
Informal institutions, inter-institutional 
procedures 
DISCRETIONARY 
(confers privileges/powers) 
 
Rules conferring facilities or privileges 
unconditionally 
Example EU: 
Direct payments to farmers (CAP), Education, 
International Emergency Aid, Science & Tech-
nology/Research 
DISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES 
 
Rules confer powers; rules about 
rules and about authority 
Example EU:  
Treaty competences, principles of conferral, 
proportionality, subsidiarity  
 
CONSTITUENT POLICIES 
 
Table 3:  Steering Instruments by Arena of Power 
 
4  CONCLUSIONS: POLICIES DETERMINE GOVERNANCE 
The key tenet of this article is not revolutionary but refers back to the most basic proposition of 
modern political science. The contribution made is an analytical framework to systematise the 
obvious link between political conflicts and the choice of policy tools, the central topos which 
has received breathtaking negligence in current work on governance beyond the state. The com-
mon concern that establishes the fruitful bond between policy types and governance modes is the 
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Linking systematically the arenas of power approach with a governance perspective offers 
a crucial value added: steering modes are conceptually related to questions of political power. 
Other than the most frequently applied broad institutional definition of governance that refers to 
the “setting of rules, the application of rules, and the enforcement of rules” (Kjær 2004: 10, 
original in italics), the arenas of power relate policy types back to the expectations actors have 
when framing the solution to a political problem at stake in a respective manner. Although policy 
types are empirically not always neatly separable and albeit policy-makers have certain scope in 
which arena to frame a policy, in the end these do refer back to particular political problems at 
stake and thus societal conflicts of different character. Thinking governance in the framework of 
the policy typology therefore provides a reply to the well-founded critique that questions of 
power and rule are utterly ignored in EU governance research (Jachtenfuchs 2001: 258). In turn, 
extending the arenas of power by a governance perspective overcomes the state-centred view to 
make the approach applicable also to political steering beyond the state. Talking to each other, 
governance in the arenas of power thus establishes a framework to analyse how ‘political systems 
exploit conflicts’ – and thus gets us to the heart of political steering. 
 
The empirical illustration of policy types and modes of governance that dominate political proc-
esses in the European Union shows that linking the two approaches offers more than an interest-
ing thought experiment. An analysis of the policy types supranational policy-making is based on 
shows which arenas of power with their respective political relationships are developed and ac-
cordingly which kinds of political conflict can be resolved on the supranational level and which 
conflicts remain outside the EU’s formal capacities for political action. Accordingly, traditional 
steering is limited to the areas in which arenas of power in terms of political relationships be-
tween the governing bodies of the EU and its citizens exist. Only in these areas can the EU es-
tablish a credible shadow of hierarchy for non-hierarchical steering. The governance perspective 
highlights in turn that non-hierarchical steering is applied not only as a supplement to such exist-
ing authority but also as a substitute for traditional steering of policy types that lack a suprana-
tional arena of power and hence the political relationships for policy formulation and implemen-
tation. Additionally, in most instances governments take up the position of citizens in represent-
ing private interests, which further blurs the picture. Accordingly, not only the absence of a 
shadow of hierarchy but also the void regarding actor constellations capable of expressing and 
contesting political conflict according to the political problem at stake render the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of such governance highly questionable because the modes of governance are not 
able to address the political conflict at stake in a way that includes the citizens affected. 
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Although  formulated  in  terms  of  effectiveness  and  legitimacy,  more  fundamental  underlying 
normative questions are evident. One may argue that a normative debate remains irrelevant as 
long as the EU has only non-hierarchical instruments in areas of high societal conflict – yet, in 
consequence one would need to accept that policies will be highly ineffective without a shadow 
of hierarchy and that they will thus promote a questionable political symbolism. The normative 
problem that ‘new governance only’ bares no danger since authority stays with the member states 
is that it we accept the undermining of the Union’s very output legitimacy. The much-acclaimed 
need for better policy delivery by the EU is a direct and inevitable consequence.
4 If, however, 
granting the EU more competences to create shadows of hierarchy, the arenas of power aught to 
be completed and made accessible by political relationships that provide structures in which so-
cietal conflicts are fought out and traceable interest representation along societal cleavages needs 
to be established. Input legitimacy would need to get a big boost. Such a development seems at 
date highly unlikely and for many also not desirable because it would mean a fundamental shift of 
authority from the state to the supranational level to turn the polity substantially more state-like. 
In any case, if just dwelling on the status quo of EU integration a more accurate delimitation of 
political authority and, because this is the flip-side of the coin, a more honest depiction of politi-
cal responsibility in the resolution of specific political conflicts would enhance a realistic assess-
ment and with it the likelihood to achieve intended effects of collective coordination. ‘Policies 
determine governance’ may therefore appear less a consistent observation of EU governance but 
a plea to successfully govern the European Union.  
                                                 
4  Policy delivery has become a buzzword especially in the aftermath of the negative votes on the 
Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands (Blair 2006; Commission of the European Communi-
ties 2005). EUSA | LA | 2009  E.G. Heidbreder  20 
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